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Abstract: The survival rate of American military personnel seriously wounded in combat has risen dramatically in recent decades.
But situations still arise when wounded soldiers cannot be saved,
nor their suffering sufficiently palliated, creating difficult ethical dilemmas for their fellow troops. The Geneva Conventions and most
codes of medical ethics prohibit direct and intentional killing of
wounded, and changing our relevant treaty obligations would have
serious strategic consequences. Battlefield euthanasia can be morally
justified, but the military profession should not argue for its legality.

I

have never experienced war directly. But in teaching and writing about
the subject for over 15 years, I have tried to imagine vividly what such
an experience must be like for combatants and civilians caught up in
its destruction. Surely one of the most horrifying aspects of war occurs
when soldiers are seriously wounded in combat, grievously suffering, and
facing little or no prospect of medical cure or pain relief as their lives
ebb away.1 Military historian John Keegan estimates that one third of
the 21,000 British soldiers killed in the battle of the Somme in early July
1916 died of wounds that would not have been fatal had the men been
evacuated quickly, but the appalling number of casualties overwhelmed
the resources and best efforts of military medical personnel.2
To be sure, the care available to American and other allied soldiers
now is dramatically better than in previous decades, let alone previous
centuries. The survival rates of our wounded soldiers rose dramatically
between the two world wars, even more during the Korea and Vietnam
conflicts with the advent of speedy evacuations by helicopter, and still
more during our recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: in 2005 nearly 20
percent of wounded US soldiers died from their injuries, but in 2010,
fewer than 8 percent died.3
However, situations still arise occasionally today—and could occur
as well in some future wars—in which the wonders of modern military
1      A previous version of this essay was presented in 2011 at the annual meeting of the
International Society of Military Ethics, and at a subsequent colloquium jointly hosted by Richard
Schoonhoven of the US Military Academy and Daniel Callahan of the Hastings Center, to whom
I am most grateful. I use the terms “soldiers” and “troops” here to refer comprehensively to all
uniformed military personnel, officer and enlisted, in every service branch. In the US context, this
includes the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard. The term “combatants” here will
encompass not only uniformed military but also illegal fighters such as insurgents and terrorists.
2      John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 274.
3      C. Chivers, “In Wider War in Afghanistan, Survival Rate of Wounded Rises,” New York Times,
January 7, 2011, A1.
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medicine are unable to reach all seriously wounded combatants in time
to save them or sufficiently palliate their suffering. Such situations
engender difficult ethical dilemmas for other soldiers witnessing their
miserable condition.
The law in these cases is clear: simply stated, no soldiers today
(including military medical personnel) are legally authorized to intentionally kill gravely wounded comrades, nor wounded enemies who no
longer pose an immediate threat to them. The Geneva Conventions
strictly prohibit killing enemy combatants who are rendered hors de
combat by their wounds: for example, the first Geneva Convention of
1949 stipulates:
Members of the armed forces … who are wounded or sick, shall be respected
and protected in all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely and cared
for by the Party to the conflict in whose power they may be…. Any attempts
upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited…;
they shall not willfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor
shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created. Only
urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to
be administered…. The Party to the conflict which is compelled to abandon
wounded or sick to the enemy shall, as far as military considerations permit,
leave with them a part of its medical personnel and material to assist in
their care.4

(Note these passages assume that humane treatment precludes intentional killing as in active euthanasia, a position challenged below.)
Signatories to the Geneva Conventions (such as the United States)
are bound to enforce them in their own military laws and regulations.
As an example of their application, the rules of engagement card issued
to every member of Coalition Forces Land Component Command in
Iraq stated, “Do not engage [fire at] anyone who has surrendered or is
out of battle due to sickness or wounds.”5 Soldiers who violate such rules
by killing wounded enemy combatants can be prosecuted for murder or
other forms of homicide.6
Moreover, professional codes of ethics have traditionally prohibited physicians (military and civilian) from directly and intentionally
killing patients under any circumstances. Although some physicians
have challenged that strict rule, advocating active euthanasia under
certain carefully specified conditions, the prohibition remains to this
day in the codes of ethics of the British and American medical associations.7 Furthermore, while physician-assisted suicide is legal in Oregon,
Washington, Montana, New Mexico, and Vermont, active euthanasia is
4      Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, ch. 2, art. 12 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, August 12, 1949).
5      CFLCC (Coalition Forces Land Component Command), “Rules of Engagement for U.S.
Military Forces in Iraq,” January 31, 2003, reprinted in Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct
of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003).
6      See also article 71 of the Lieber Code, which influenced several subsequent Hague and
Geneva conventions: “Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly
disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if
duly convicted, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after
having committed his misdeed.” Francis Lieber, General Orders no. 100, promulgated by President
Abraham Lincoln, April 24, 1863.
7      “End-of-Life Decisions: Views of the BMA” (London: British Medical Association, 2009);
American Medical Association, “Euthanasia,” Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.21 (Chicago:
American Medical Association, 2009).
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illegal in every US state, and in most other nations (apart from Holland,
Belgium, and a few others).
However, this essay will consider certain conditions under which it
may be morally justifiable for military medical personnel or other soldiers to kill gravely wounded combatants, either their enemies or their
own comrades; in other words, explore whether military mercy-killing
is sometimes morally permissible. (In theory, mercy-killing by soldiers
might encompass gravely wounded civilians as well, but I’ll largely ignore
those instances here.) I will also weigh the potential consequences of
changing relevant military laws and regulations, which may indicate that
the current prohibition of battlefield euthanasia should not be qualified
after all.
The analysis will proceed as follows: first, discussion on the ethics
of killing in general and euthanasia in particular, and why the intentional killing of innocent persons is prima facie immoral, but not always
or absolutely immoral; second, summarize several illustrative cases of
battlefield euthanasia; third, I’ll examine contending arguments in the
recent scholarly literature regarding such cases; and finally, offer concluding reflections on the ethics and law of mercy-killing in war.
If the strategic relevance of this essay isn’t clear yet, note that if
strategic leaders were contemplating whether to legalize battlefield
euthanasia, doing so would involve much more than simply rewriting
our relevant military manuals. Before that could occur, formal changes
in our commitments to the Geneva Conventions would have to be made,
which would not only require presidential approval, but also two-thirds
of the Senate. (As formal treaties signed by a president and ratified by
the Senate, the Geneva Conventions have the same status under the US
Constitution [Art. II, section 2] as does any other federal law.)

The Ethics of Killing and Euthanasia

Since battlefield euthanasia is a form of killing, it is morally suspect,
and the burden of proof falls on those who would allow it. Now, it is not
always wrong to kill persons intentionally. For example, in defense of
oneself and other innocent people, it may be ethical (i.e. morally right or
justified) to use deadly force if necessary to stop a murderous attacker.
But it’s usually wrong to kill people; most persons in most cases have a
prima facie right not to be killed.8 Why is that the case?
A usefully straightforward answer to that question has been
expressed in only slightly different ways by philosophers Jonathan
Glover, Thomas Nagel, James Rachels, Don Marquis, Dan Brock and
Jeff McMahan: killing persons is prima facie immoral because it deprives

8     Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977); Thomas Nagel,
Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1-10; James Rachels, The End of
Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Don Marquis, “Why Abortion
Is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 4 (1989): 183-202; Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical
Essays in Biomedical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jeff McMahan, The Ethics
of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). In David Perry,
Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press,
2009), Ch. 1, I explain the distinction between prima facie and absolute moral principles, drawing from
W. D. Ross’s moral theory.
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them of everything that they currently value and all that they could value
in the future.9 As explained by Marquis:
What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor
its effect on the victim’s friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim….
The loss of one’s life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one’s future….
When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have
been part of my future personal life, but also what I would come to value.10

Or, in the plain-spoken words of Clint Eastwood’s character William
Munny in the film Unforgiven, “It’s a hell of a thing, killin’ a man. Take
away all he’s got, and all he’s ever gonna have.”11 When we grieve for our
loved ones killed in war, we not only feel the loss of their companionship, we regret the fact that, were it not for the war, they might have lived
long, rich lives. Death in battle deprived them of future lives as much
worth living as our own.
But again, the right of persons not to be killed is not absolute: it
can be qualified in at least three ways: first, the right of soldiers not to
be killed is qualified in wartime, unless and until they have surrendered
or are incapacitated by wounds or sickness; second, a right not to be
killed can be forfeited, by murderous attackers or terrorist bomb-makers,
for instance; and third, a right not to be killed can be waived, as in cases
where competent patients request assisted suicide or active euthanasia.12
As Marquis argued, “Persons who are severely and incurably ill, who
face a future of pain and despair, and who wish to die will not have
suffered a loss if they are killed.”13 Dan Brock similarly contended that
“the right not to be killed, like other rights, should be waivable when
the person makes a competent decision that continued life is no longer
wanted or a good, but is instead worse than no further life at all.”14
Normally it is wrong directly and intentionally to kill innocent
persons, “innocent” meaning either “not guilty” of a capital crime, or
“not a threat” in war, such as civilian noncombatants and wounded
combatants.15 But in euthanasia scenarios, including battlefield ones, the
fact that a person is innocent in either sense is morally irrelevant.
Although active euthanasia is illegal in most countries, I’m persuaded that it can be morally justified in some instances, chiefly: 1)
where a person’s illness or injury is terminal, meaning that all lifesustaining treatments are qualitatively futile, or 2) where the severely
sick or wounded victim could theoretically be saved, but the needed
9      If there is an afterlife that is objectively valuable for us, then death would not deprive us of
that good. But I and the philosophers I have noted here are focusing exclusively on value in this
world and this life.
10      Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” 189-190.
11      Unforgiven, directed by Clint Eastwood, 1992.
12      The moral status of combatants in wartime is puzzling, and difficult to describe precisely.
Strictly speaking they have not forfeited their right not to be killed, yet it is not unjust in war for
their enemies to kill them. As Michael Walzer noted, soldiers on both sides of a war have “an equal
right to kill.” Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New
York: Basic Books, 1977), 41.
13      Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” 191.
14      Brock, Life and Death, 213, emphasis added.
15      Michael Walzer’s points about noncombatant immunity are important: “We are all immune
to start with; our right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships. That right is
lost by those who bear arms ‘effectively’ because they pose a danger to other people. It is retained
by those who don’t bear arms at all” Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 145.
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medical resources are unavailable or extremely scarce (as in conditions
of battlefield triage); and 3) to prevent or end the victim’s unbearable,
unrelenting suffering, when sedation is unavailable, or if sedating them
to a state of unconsciousness short of death would be pointless, no better
than death itself for them.
Even under those conditions, one must obviously not euthanize
people against their stated wishes! If they still value their lives, then they
have not waived their right not to be killed, no matter what they may have
indicated previously. Ideally, active euthanasia should only be done with
the informed consent of patients, or, if they are no longer competent to
reason, in light of their previously expressed wishes. Military personnel
sometimes refer to “the soldiers’ pact,” an “unwritten code that if one
soldier is wounded and on the verge of death, another should hasten
the inevitable,” which could potentially represent informed consent to
euthanasia.16
But there are also some instances of nonvoluntary active euthanasia
that can be morally justified as being in the “best interests” of no-longercompetent (or never competent) patients, when they can experience little
or nothing more than overwhelming suffering, or when it is no longer
possible for them (or anyone else in a similar condition) to value their
own continued existence.17 Soldiers sometimes sustain wounds so grave
that death would be more beneficial to them than continued life.
To illustrate various conditions in which battlefield euthanasia is
sometimes contemplated, I turn now to several brief cases.

Illustrative Cases of Battlefield Euthanasia18
Ambrose Bierce’s Tale of “The Coup de Grâce”

Bierce served in the Union army through most of the American
Civil War, and later became a famous journalist and essayist. In “The
Coup de Grâce,” one of many short stories inspired by his wartime experience, he tells of a captain in a Massachusetts infantry regiment named
Downing Madwell, who discovers a friend gravely wounded in battle:
Sergeant Halcrow was mortally hurt. His clothing was deranged; it seemed to
have been violently torn apart, exposing the abdomen.... There had been no
great effusion of blood. The only visible wound was a wide, ragged opening
in the abdomen. It was defiled with earth and dead leaves. Protruding from
it was a loop of small intestine.... The man who had suffered these monstrous mutilations was alive. At intervals he moved his limbs; he moaned at
every breath. He stared blankly into the face of his friend and if touched
screamed. In his giant agony he had torn up the ground on which he lay; his
clenched hands were full of leaves and twigs and earth. Articulate speech
was beyond his power; it was impossible to know if he were sensible to
anything but pain. The expression of his face was an appeal; his eyes were
full of prayer. For what? There was no misreading that look; the captain

16      Kathryn Carlson, “‘An Act of So-Called Mercy’: Semrau Case Hinges on ‘Soldier’s Pact,’”
National Post, July 7, 2010.
17      Glover, Causing Death, 190-200; Rachels, End of Life, 179-180.
18      A few cases included in a draft version of this essay had to be excluded from publication in
Parameters due to space constraints. They examined stories of King Saul of Israel, Napoleon’s army
infected by plague, and Jeremiah Gage at Gettysburg. The author will provide those case analyses to
readers upon request to him at daperry@davidson.edu.
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had too frequently seen it in eyes of those whose lips had still the power to
formulate it by an entreaty for death.19

Capt. Madwell notices wild pigs in the distance feeding on the
bodies of dead soldiers. Though Bierce does not suggest Madwell forsees
a similar fate befalling his friend, perhaps while still alive, we are led to
imagine that horrifying prospect ourselves. Madwell steps away from
the sergeant to shoot a fatally wounded horse; then, having used his last
bullet, he plunges his sword into his friend’s chest. The story ends with
the appearance of Madwell’s superior officer with two stretcher-bearers,
suggesting perhaps that Madwell may be punished for his decision to kill
his friend rather than call for medical assistance.20
It is unclear whether Bierce ever committed or observed any actual
coups de grâce during the war.21 But he later published some of his views
on mercy-killing in a newspaper column:
[I]n all seriousness I believe that the mercy which we extend to dumb
animals, “putting them out of misery” when unable to relieve it, we
are barbarians to withhold from our own kind.... Scores of times it
has been my unhappy lot to deny the piteous appeals of helpless
fellow creatures, comrades of the battle field, for the supreme and
precious gift by which a simple movement of the arm I was able and
willing to bestow—the simple gift of death. Every physician has had
the same experience, and many (may blessings attend them!) have
secretly given the relief implored.22

Bierce indicates here that he had indeed witnessed cases like Sgt.
Halcrow’s during the war, but unlike Capt. Madwell he regretfully did not
perform active euthanasia, perhaps out of fear of being court-martialed.

Lawrence of Arabia

T. E. Lawrence asserts in Seven Pillars of Wisdom that “the Turks did
not take Arab prisoners. Indeed, they used to kill them horribly; so in
mercy, we were finishing those of our badly wounded who would have
to be left helpless on abandoned ground.”23 Unlike most WWI armies,
Lawrence’s Arab forces typically fought guerrilla-style, far from any
field hospitals where his wounded might otherwise have been deposited; indeed, his fighters apparently travelled without a medic, let alone
a military physician.

Eugene Sledge

Sledge served in the U.S. Marine Corps during WWII, fighting in
two major battles against the Japanese on Pacific islands. In his eloquent
memoir, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa, he recalls the murderous
hatred that the Marines and Japanese felt for each other, which “resulted

19     Ambrose Bierce, “The Coup de Grâce” (1889), http://www.classicreader.com/book/1168/1.
20      Ibid.
21      Bierce came upon dead Union soldiers whose faces had been eaten by wild pigs after a
skirmish in West Virginia in 1861. Roy Morris, Ambrose Bierce: Alone in Bad Company (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 31.
22      Ambrose Bierce, “The Morality of Suicide,” San Francisco Examiner, July 5, 1891, in Ambrose
Bierce: A Sole Survivor: Bits of Autobiography, ed. S. Joshi and David Schultz (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1998), 225.
23      T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 363.
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in savage, ferocious fighting with no holds barred.” Both sides were
“reluctant to take prisoners.” The Marines were
too familiar with the sight of helpless wounded Americans lying flat on their
backs on stretchers getting shot by Japanese snipers while we struggled to
evacuate them…. None of us could bear the thought of leaving wounded
behind. We never did, because the Japanese certainly would have tortured
them to death.

Corpsmen (Navy medics who also accompany Marine units) learned
to be extremely wary of treating wounded Japanese, who “invariably
exploded grenades when approached … killing their enemies along with
themselves.”24
One particularly disturbing incident involved a Marine on Peleliu
who found a seriously wounded and partially paralyzed but still-conscious Japanese soldier:
The Japanese’s mouth glowed with huge gold-crowned teeth, and his captor
wanted them. He put the point of his kabar [knife] on the base of a tooth
and hit the handle with the palm of his hand. Because the Japanese was
kicking his feet and thrashing about, the knife point glanced off the tooth
and sank into the victim’s mouth. The Marine cursed him and with a slash
cut his cheeks open to each ear. He put his foot on the sufferer’s lower
jaw and tried again. Blood poured out of the soldier’s mouth. He made
a gurgling noise and thrashed wildly. I shouted, “Put the man out of his
misery.” All I got for an answer was a cussing out. Another Marine ran up,
put a bullet in the enemy soldier’s brain, and ended his agony.25

John Masters

During the Second World War, British Army officer John Masters
served primarily in Burma fighting the Japanese. In his 1961 memoir,
The Road Past Mandalay, he described a wrenching decision he had to
make in May 1944 while commanding a brigade in northern Burma that
was about to be overrun by a larger Japanese force. His unit had previously cared for and evacuated all of its sick and injured men, through
extremely challenging terrain and weather. But now it lacked enough
healthy men, horses and mules to safely withdraw all of its wounded:
some would have to be left behind. So Masters ordered 19 of those in
the worst condition, whom his medical officer judged to be near death,
to be put to death immediately rather than abandoned to die of their
wounds or at the hands of their captors. All of those men who were still
conscious were given morphine before being shot.26

Gene Woodley

Arthur “Gene” Woodley, who served in the US Army in Vietnam,
1968-69, had the horrific experience of finding a fellow US soldier who
had been captured by the enemy, skinned alive, staked to the ground, and
left to die. Still conscious, the victim pleaded with Woodley to kill him;
he was near death and far from medical care. After about 20 minutes of
anxious deliberation, and the man’s continuing requests to die, Woodley

24      Eugene Sledge, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990), 34, 283, 130, 118.
25      Ibid., 120.
26      John Masters, The Road Past Mandalay (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), 253-254.
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shot him in the head. A commentator adds, “And after they buried him,
buried him deep, Woodley cried.”27

Incident at Goose Green

On 2 June 1982 during the war between Argentina and the United
Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, approximately 1,200 Argentine
prisoners of war were detained in a sheep shed at Goose Green on East
Falkland Island. Concerned about piles of artillery ammunition near the
shed, the prisoners asked for and obtained permission to move it a safe
distance away from them. Unfortunately, as several of them did so, some
of the ammunition exploded, possibly due to booby traps set earlier
by Argentine soldiers. As recalled by retired British Army Col. David
Benest, three POWs died and nine others were badly burnt. A British
medic at the scene, Sgt. Fowler, assessed one of the still-burning men
to be fatally injured and possibly suffering horribly, and shot him to end
his misery. (A subsequent military inquiry concluded that no war crime
had been committed.) The other Argentines wounded in the explosion
were treated and evacuated; one had to have both legs amputated, and
died on the operating table.28

Roger Maylunet in Iraq

On 21 May 2004, US Army Capt. Rogelio “Roger” Maynulet was
commanding a company of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq. While
searching for insurgent forces south of Baghdad near Najaf and Kufa,
they chased and fired on a suspicious black sedan, which crashed after
its driver and passenger were shot. As later reported in Stars and Stripes,
“When a medic pulled the driver out of the car, it was clear he had suffered critical injuries, with part of his skull blown away.”29 Although the
medic (for unknown reasons) did not thoroughly examine the victim or
attempt to treat him, he told Capt. Maynulet that he was dying. Maynulet
then apparently aimed his gun at the driver and shot him twice in the
head. The incident was captured on video by an unmanned aerial vehicle,
unbeknownst to Maynulet at the time.30
Defense witnesses at Maynulet’s Article-32 hearing (a military grand
jury) testified that there had been battles with insurgents in the immediate vicinity of the crash, so evacuation of the wounded driver was not
possible.31 But Maynulet was subsequently court-martialed on charges of
assault with intent to commit murder and dereliction of duty.32
27      William King, “Bloods: Teaching the Afro-American Experience of the Vietnam Conflict,”
in Soldier Talk: The Vietnam War in Oral Narrative, ed. Paul Budra and Michael Zeitlin (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2004), 190.
28      During the Falklands conflict, Benest held the rank of captain in the Second Battalion, The
Parachute Regiment, and was its Regimental Signals Officer. He recently stated, “I remain convinced
that Sgt. Fowler acted in the best of motives, so as to alleviate human suffering.” David Benest,
e-mail messages to author, January 5-12, 2011. See also John Frost, 2 PARA Falklands: The Battalion
at War (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), 102. I have been unable to identify Sgt. Fowler’s first
name.
29      Jason Chudy and Kent Harris, “1st AD Captain to Face Court-Martial in Shooting Death of
Wounded Iraqi Man,” Stars and Stripes, December 8, 2004.
30      Nancy Montgomery, “Maynulet Enters Not Guilty Plea in ‘Mercy Killing’ Trial,” Stars and
Stripes, March 29, 2005.
31      Kevin Dougherty, “Article 32 Hearing in Death of Iraqi Man Concludes,” Stars and Stripes,
October 16, 2004.
32      Chudy and Harris, “1st AD Captain to Face Court-Martial.”
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During his trial, Capt. Maynulet’s attorney claimed that “his actions
were guided by the part of the law of war that says ‘maximize humanity,
minimize suffering.’” Maynulet said in his own defense, “[The driver]
was in a state I didn’t think was dignified. I had to put him out of his
misery…. It was the right thing to do…. It was the honorable thing to
do.”33
Prosecutors countered that there is no justification or exception in
the laws of war permitting soldiers to execute anyone rendered hors de
combat by wounds. Maynulet was convicted by his court-martial panel of
assault with the intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, a less serious
charge than what he initially faced.34 He was subsequently sentenced
with discharge from military service, but no time in prison.35

Cardenas Alban and Johnny Horne, Jr.

Alban and Horne were both US Army staff sergeants deployed in
Baghdad, Iraq. On 18 August 2004, according to Edmund Sanders of
the Los Angeles Times, their unit
received a tip that militants in dump trucks were planting roadside bombs….
So when … Alban … saw an object fall from a garbage truck in the distance,
his company took positions around the vehicle and unleashed a barrage of
fire from rifles and a 25-millimeter cannon atop a Bradley fighting vehicle.
The truck exploded in flames. As soldiers … approached the burning
vehicle, they did not find insurgents. The victims were mainly teenagers,
hired to work the late shift picking up trash for about $5 a night, witnesses
said. Medics scrambled to treat the half a dozen people strewn around the
scene. A dispute broke out among a handful of soldiers standing over one
severely wounded young man who was moaning in pain. An unwounded
Iraqi claiming to be a relative of the victim pleaded in broken English for
soldiers to help him. But to the horror of bystanders, Alban … retrieved
an M-231 assault rifle and fired into the wounded man’s body. Seconds later
… Horne … grabbed an M-16 rifle and also shot the victim…. US officials
have since characterized the shooting as a “mercy killing,” citing statements
by Alban and Horne that they had shot the wounded Iraqi “to put him
out of his misery.” Military attorneys, however, are calling it premeditated
murder and have charged the two sergeants, saying the victim’s suffering was
no excuse for the soldiers’ actions.36

I have not been able to determine whether the medics at the scene
made any attempt to treat the man who was shot by Alban and Horne,
nor if they did not, why not. Why wasn’t he at least given a sedating dose
of morphine? Perhaps they were too busy caring for other wounded
Iraqis whom they believed had better prospects of survival.
The two sergeants were later court-martialed, convicted of murder,
and sentenced to prison.37

33      Nancy Montgomery, “Maynulet Testifies in Own Defense, Says Killing Wounded Iraqi ‘Right
Thing to Do,’” Stars and Stripes, March 31, 2005.
34      Nancy Montgomery, “U.S. Army Captain Is Found Guilty in Shooting Death of Wounded
Iraqi,” Stars and Stripes, April 1, 2005.
35      Nancy Montgomery and Ben Murray, “Maynulet Is Discharged from Service, but Gets No
Jail Time in Death of Iraqi,” Stars and Stripes, April 2, 2005.
36      Edmund Sanders, “‘Mercy Killing’ of Iraqi Revives GI Conduct Debate,” Los Angeles Times,
November 5, 2004.
37      Tim Whitmire, “Short Sentences, Dismissals Show Wartime Murder Prosecutions Hard,”
Associated Press, June 5, 2005.

128

Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15

Robert Semrau in Afghanistan

On 19 October 2008, Canadian Forces Capt. Robert Semrau was
serving in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province with an Operation Mentor
Liaison Team (OMLET) on patrol with an Afghan company when they
were attacked by the Taliban. An airstrike was ordered, and Apache helicopters engaged the Taliban fighters. Two who had been hit by Apache
fire were soon found: one was clearly dead; the other was still alive but
gravely wounded in the stomach and both legs. An Afghan army captain
decided that the man should not be treated, for reasons unclear. Capt.
Semrau apparently agreed, and decided not to request a medical evacuation either, in spite of the availability of British helicopters at the time,
out of concern the area was still dangerous. (This begs the question,
are not their pilots trained and expected to land in dangerous places
to save wounded combatants and civilians? Were they even consulted
on the decision not to evacuate?) A few minutes later, Semrau walked
back alone to the wounded Taliban fighter and fired two rifle shots into
his chest. As a result, Semrau was court-martialed in 2010 on several
charges including second-degree murder.38
At his trial, witnesses stated Semrau told them immediately after the
incident “he felt it was necessary … the humane thing to do. He couldn’t
live with himself if he left … an injured human being in this condition.”39
Semrau also reportedly said he was “willing to accept whatever followed
on it and that it was a mercy kill,” moreover, “he hoped anyone would
do the same thing to anyone else, even himself.”40
In the end, Capt. Semrau was acquitted of murder but convicted on
a lesser charge of “disgraceful conduct.”41 At his sentencing hearing a
military prosecutor argued, “Those incapacitated by wounds are to be
treated humanely—this is one of the basic rules of humanity, this is one
of the basic rules of combat. Treating a wounded combatant humanely
does not mean accelerating his death.”42 Semrau was subsequently
demoted to second lieutenant and dismissed from military service by his
sentencing judge, but not ordered to serve any time in prison.43
Paul Robinson, a former British and Canadian military officer who
has published extensively in military ethics, commented on the verdict
in Semrau’s case:
It’s a curious result—if he didn’t kill the Afghan, then he’s not guilty of disgraceful conduct. If he’s guilty of disgraceful conduct, then it follows that
38      Andrew Duffy, “Soldier on Trial for Wrongful Battlefield Death Was Afghan Mentor,”
National Post, March 25, 2010, and “Corporal Saw Captain Pointing Rifle at Afghan, Court Martial
Hears,” National Post, April.27, 2010.
39      Commenting on a hypothetical case based on the Semrau incident, retired Canadian Forces
officer Peter Bradley asks, “Can the average patrol member determine when someone is suffering
unbearably? How do we define ‘unbearably’? There are also problems with the notion that the
wounded enemy is going to die soon. Who knows who is going to die and when? If he is going to die
soon anyway, why not wait until he dies of his wounds?” Peter Bradley, “Is Battlefield Mercy Killing
Morally Justifiable?” Canadian Military Journal 11, no. 1 (2010): 11. But I think Bradley underestimates
the ability of soldiers to make accurate judgments in cases like Semrau’s.
40      Andrew Duffy, “Wounded Taliban’s Death a ‘Mercy Kill,’ Soldier Testifies,” National Post,
April 28, 2010.
41      Kathryn Carlson and Andrew Duffy, “Semrau Not Guilty of Murdering Taliban Fighter,”
National Post, July 19, 2010.
42      Andrew Duffy, “Semrau to Wait until September for Sentencing,” National Post, July 27, 2010.
43      Andrew Duffy, “Canadian Soldier Sentenced for Battlefield Mercy Killing,” National Post,
October 5, 2010.
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the jurors were convinced that he did the deed, in which case he should also
be guilty of murder or manslaughter. It doesn’t square very easily—perhaps
the only way of making sense of the verdict is that the jury was certain that
he shot the body, but could not be certain that the body was alive, in which
case the disgraceful conduct is mutilation of a dead body. More probably,
though, it’s a case of jury nullification—they knew he did it, but had some
sympathy for him and didn’t want him sent to prison for life so they found
him guilty of something lesser to ensure that he got a lighter sentence but
didn’t get off scott free. Not good law, probably, but could have made sense
to the panel. I should add that if the mortally wounded person had been
Canadian, I don’t believe for one instant that Capt. Semrau would have shot
him.44

Matt Gurney, an editor at Canada’s National Post, wrote sympathetically of the dilemma that Semrau faced on the ground in Afghanistan:
Capt. Semrau may have broken the law, and there are those who could reasonably argue that he has sinned against God. I would not choose to argue
those points. But I will say that were I the soldier in that situation, I would
not hesitate to shoot, and were I the broken man waiting to die in the dirt,
I would welcome the bullet.45

Recent Moral Assessments of Battlefield Euthanasia
Steven Swann

In 1986 the Academy of Medicine of Washington DC awarded its
annual prize in bioethics to Capt. (later Col.) Steven Swann of the US
Army Medical Corps for his essay, “Euthanasia on the Battlefield.”
Swann’s article caused quite a stir among fellow physicians and bioethicists in advocating active euthanasia in some wartime circumstances.
Writing in the waning days of the Cold War, Swann begins with a
plausible scenario in a hypothetical war between NATO and the Soviet
Union in Europe. He imagines himself in the role of a surgeon near
the front lines who is ordered to evacuate in the face of an advancing
enemy, but who cannot possibly take all of his wounded with him. He
further speculates that the Russians are executing all severely wounded
prisoners, so that they cannot be trusted to care for them if captured; in
other words, Swann suggests a situation like the actual one that faced
Masters and Lawrence above:
On the modern battlefield, physicians will be faced with wounded of
all types, of many nationalities, and in greater numbers than previously
known…. Gunshot and fragment wounds are to be expected, but with the
lethal and diverse arsenals available to potential combatants, one must expect
more severe and incapacitating wounds, such as multiple trauma, multiple
amputations, severe burns, chemical casualties (especially from blister and
nerve agents), as well as burns, blast injuries, and lethal contamination from
nuclear weapons. Many of the wounded being seen with such injuries will
not be attended because treatment will not be technically or physically
available. The medical support system will be overcome with wounded, will

44      Paul Robinson, e-mail message to author, January 21, 2011.
45      Matt Gurney, “On the Battlefield, Morality and Law Fight to the Death,” National Post, July
23, 2010. The editors of that periodical made similar points after Semrau’s sentencing, adding that
“killing someone out of malice is very different from killing someone out of compassion. It’s time
the law reflected that, both on the battlefield and off.” “Absence of Malice,” editorial, National Post,
October 7, 2010.
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not have enough resources, will not have enough time, and will not have
transportation ready to bring the wounded to a treatment facility.46

Echoing a famous argument by James Rachels, Swann contends (in
contrast to orthodox medical ethics) that there is no necessary moral
difference between killing and letting-die, meaning that if someone’s
motives and intentions are ethical, then either choice can be justified;
moreover, active euthanasia can actually be more ethical than letting
die, if euthanasia will result in less suffering to a mortally wounded or
terminally ill patient.47 I concur.

Thomas Beam

Beam is a retired colonel who served in the US Army Medical
Corps, directed a hospital operating room during the Persian Gulf War,
and was a medical ethics consultant to the Army Surgeon General. He
contributed an essay on battlefield medical ethics to an impressive twovolume anthology on military medical ethics, in which he commented
on euthanasia in wartime.48
Beam notes that the normal moral obligation to respect the autonomous preferences of patients is limited in the military context. For
example, although competent civilian patients have a right to refuse all
life-sustaining treatments (in which case their physicians must allow
them to die), soldiers don’t have that right to the same degree or scope:
military medics and doctors may be obliged to save soldiers lives against
their will if doing so will allow them to return to the fight later. In addition, a severely wounded soldier might desperately want to be saved, but
may nevertheless be placed by doctors in the lowest-priority category
of battlefield triage (“expectant,” i.e., expected to die even if treated)
in order to devote critically scarce medical resources on salvageable
patients instead.49
Beam addresses questions of battlefield euthanasia with commendable nuance and balance, analyzing directly the provocative positions
taken by Swann. Considering in turn several relevant ethical principles—
respect for autonomy, beneficence and nonmaleficence toward patients,
distributive justice, and utility—Beam concludes points both for and
against euthanasia can be made under each one, making him reluctant
to take a categorical stance either way. For instance, nonmaleficence can
be construed both to forbid killing and to forbid allowing someone to
suffer needlessly, though physicians have tended historically to side with
the former when it conflicts with the latter. In the end, Beam advocates
upholding the current military law and policy (in effect) prohibiting
euthanasia, out of a concern for potential abuses if it were legally permitted. But he admits he could not rule out resorting himself to euthanasia
under conditions like those hypothesized by Swann.50
46      Steven Swann, “Euthanasia on the Battlefield,” Military Medicine 152, no. 11 (1987): 546.
47      James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine 292 (1975):
78-80, and End of Life; Swann, “Euthanasia on the Battlefield,” 546-8.
48      Thomas Beam, “Medical Ethics on the Battlefield: The Crucible of Military Medical Ethics,”
in Military Medical Ethics, vol. 2, ed. Thomas Beam and Linette Sparacino (Washington: Office of the
Surgeon General, Department of the Army, and Borden Institute, 2003), 367-402.
49      Ibid., 379, 383-384.
50      Ibid., 384-394.
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Michael Gross

Gross teaches applied and professional ethics at the University
of Haifa and has served in the Israeli military. His many publications
include Bioethics and Armed Conflict, one of the most comprehensive treatments of the subject published by a single author.51
Gross argues that the normal obligation of military medical personnel not to abandon their wounded can be overridden by military necessity
in cases where doing so would put an important military mission at risk,
such as delay a tactical retreat in circumstances experienced by Masters
and imagined by Swann. Gross further claims that soldiers who have
been incapacitated by wounds—at least if their wounds will prevent
them from ever returning to combat—have thoroughly ceased being
combatants and thus regain all the rights they had as civilians, including a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, which Gross contends
“military organizations rarely recognize.”52 But then, very few civilians
anywhere in the world have a legal right to obtain active euthanasia, even
where they have the right to refuse all life-sustaining treatments. So the
question becomes, do mortally wounded soldiers have a moral right to
be euthanized, in spite of legal and professional prohibitions?
Like Rachels and Swann, Gross believes there is not always a clear
moral difference between passive and active euthanasia, since even
passive euthanasia can be immoral if done with evil intent, e.g., to collect
on their life insurance. But unlike Rachels and Swann, and consistent
with orthodox medical ethics as evinced by Paré and Desgenettes, Gross
regards the intentional killing of patients as always immoral. So, according to Gross, while it might be justified to abandon wounded soldiers
in the face of an overwhelming enemy advance, it would be unethical
to use active euthanasia on them (as Masters ordered in Burma), even
when those soldiers are likely to die of their wounds in great suffering. Curiously, Gross seems to be vaguely amenable to euthanasia in
the face of near-certain torture by enemies. But overall, he judges,
“Commanders may place their soldiers in harm’s way but they may not
kill them.” Although he thinks that withholding life-sustaining treatment on request is not murder, he contends “killing on request is still
murder.”53
However, Gross’s argument against active euthanasia stumbles in
at least two ways: first, he fails to show how dying of one’s wounds is
any less horrible from the victim’s perspective than dying under enemy
torture, hence why euthanasia would be clearly wrong in the former case
but possibly justified in the latter. Second, he does not recognize that
acceding to the request of competent adults to kill them is obviously
unlike murder in that respect—in other words, Gross ignores the question of whether competent adults can credibly waive their right not to be
killed (as Brock persuasively argued they could).

51      Michael Gross, Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War (London: MIT
Press, 2006).
52      Ibid., 127.
53      Ibid., 129-134.
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Stephen Deakin

Deakin is a professor of leadership at the United Kingdom’s Royal
Military Academy at Sandhurst. His 2013 article, “Mercy Killing in
Battle,” is one of the most recent scholarly treatments of the subject. The
greatest strength of this essay lies in Deakin’s rich use of vivid narratives
of wartime mercy killing during the past two centuries, including the
Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War, both world wars, and recent
conflicts in the Falklands, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The author
persuasively argues that battlefield euthanasia is much more common
than civilians have assumed, in part because veterans have been reluctant to speak or write about it.54
However, Deakin’s ethical analysis is problematic in some respects.
First, a minor quibble: he states early on, “Battlefield mercy killings
are repugnant. Intentionally to take an innocent person’s life is a very
grave matter both legally and ethically: it is battlefield murder.”55 Legally
that is true, it is a war crime, an “atrocity;” but if Deakin has already
concluded that ethically it is murder, then there was no reason for him
to pursue the matter further, because murder by definition (i.e., unjust
killing) is unethical. His point would have been clearer had he stated
more narrowly that mercy killing is considered murder under the laws
of armed conflict.
Second, Deakin claims because mercy killing is outside of battle
(or combat) per se, therefore the ethical considerations of jus in bello do
not apply. Here the author makes a serious mistake, since the jus in bello
criteria of noncombatant immunity, military necessity and proportionality clearly bear on whether it is permissible intentionally and directly
to kill noncombatants. In other words, jus in bello criteria are obviously
relevant to mercy killings. At the very least, Deakin would need to show
mercy killings are justified exceptions to the jus in bello rules, and ideally
also to wrestle with what those exceptions would entail in terms of
modifications to the Geneva Conventions. Instead, the author appeals
to “last resort”—a jus ad bellum criterion not obviously appropriate in this
context—and “good faith”—which he never clearly defines but which
seems to encompass several ethical principles that ought rather to be
distinguished.56
On the other hand, Deakin helpfully points out that stress-filled
wartime situations in which euthanasia might seem justified usually
differ from end-of-life choices in peacetime hospital settings, where
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments can occur in
light of a patient’s advance directive, medical prognosis, etc. But, he
also rightly hints that domestic euthanasia debates may have increasing
relevance to battlefield cases.57 This reader wishes that he had explored
those connections in more depth, since there can be important similarities regarding consent (e.g., waiving one’s right not to be killed), scarcity
or futility of life-sustaining treatments, alleviation of severe suffering,
and whether patients/soldiers value extending their lives any further.
54      Stephen Deakin, “Mercy Killing in Battle,” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 2 (2013): 162-171..
55      Ibid., 163.
56      Ibid., 172-177.
57      Ibid., 172, 178.
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Concluding Reflections

As argued above, as people have a prima facie right not to be killed,
it is usually unethical to kill anyone who poses no imminent lethal
threat to others, or has not committed a capital crime. However, I’m
also persuaded that some instances of battlefield euthanasia are not only
morally justifiable, they can be more ethical than allowing someone to
die in agony from wounds or disease. Thus, I am uncomfortable with
the current strict prohibition on battlefield euthanasia, which I think
unfairly punishes some morally justified acts.58
But should we change military laws to permit mercy-killing? Several
military officers have expressed strong objections to that idea. Retired
US Marine Corps lawyer Col. Stephen Shi argues that “hard cases make
bad law,” and concludes that it is better to keep the rule for soldiers very
simple: do not kill anybody who is not a threat.59 A similar view is held
by retired US Army lawyer Col. Fred Taylor, who also thinks it would
be unfair to ask soldiers to bear the burden of making euthanasia decisions or carrying them out, given all of the other pressures and traumas
weighing on them in combat and counterinsurgency operations.60
Retired US Army Col. Robert Knutson, worried about the effects of
shock and sedation on seriously wounded combatants, doubts that we
could plausibly consider their requests for euthanasia under such conditions to be rational. He also believes it would be dangerous to allow
soldiers to make euthanasia decisions for others.61 These are important
concerns, though they might be eliminated by restricting those authorized to perform battlefield euthanasia to military medics and physicians
exclusively.
The most our troops would typically expect on the battlefield is
for medics to treat wounds and save lives as best they can, and use
as much morphine as needed to alleviate suffering, even if the dose
required might also suppress the victim’s breathing. (In the domestic
medical context, this is sometimes called “terminal sedation.”) Some
even tougher cases may continue to arise in war, where the numbers
of seriously wounded soldiers overwhelm the ability of medics to treat
or sedate them, or when military necessity requires the most gravely
wounded to be abandoned. In those situations, I fully sympathize with
commanders who feel compelled to end their misery directly rather than
let them suffer and die of wounds or torture.
I confess, though, that I am unable to construct a satisfactory rule
explicitly permitting battlefield euthanasia capable of being practically
incorporated into legal Rules of Engagement, let alone see any possibility
of relevant changes being made to our more fundamental treaty obligations under the Geneva Conventions. The general rule against directly
and intentionally killing anyone who is not a threat is so important in
58      Bradley, “Is Battlefield Mercy Killing Morally Justifiable?” 11, claims that because battlefield
euthanasia is illegal, it therefore cannot uphold Kantian obligations to act only on universalizeable
maxims and treat persons as ends and not merely as means. But he ignores questions of whether the
law itself should be changed to uphold the right of a competent patient to obtain active euthanasia,
and whether respect for human dignity permits nonvoluntary euthanasia, in or out of wartime.
59      Stephen Shi, e-mail message to author, January 21, 2011. (See also Gross, Bioethics and Armed
Conflict, 132.) Before becoming a military lawyer, Shi was a combat infantry officer.
60      Fred Taylor, telephone message to author, December 29, 2010, and e-mail message to author,
January 16, 2011.
61      Robert Knutson, e-mail message to author, December 3, 2010.
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most wartime scenarios, and so difficult to uphold consistently amid the
psychological terrors and hatreds that war induces, that it seems unwise
to stipulate legal exceptions to it, even to permit morally justified cases
of mercy-killing.62 This may seem an anticlimactic conclusion to reach—
affirming the moral justification of active euthanasia in some instances,
yet failing to endorse a legal authorization for it on the battlefield—but
there are previously mentioned precedents for that combination of views
in domestic US law, namely the five states that permit physician-assisted
suicide, but also prohibit active euthanasia, out of concern that legalizing
the latter would lead to regrettable abuses.
However, it may be that consideration of the kinds of harrowing
dilemmas that I have explored in this essay might at least encourage
court-martial panels and convening authorities to impose lenient sentences on well-intentioned soldiers convicted of battlefield euthanasia.

62      See my book Partly Cloudy, ch. 4 on “Anticipating and Preventing Atrocities in War.”

